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On September 30, 2009, as the Federal Government’s efforts to persuade Americans to 
vaccinate themselves and their families against the Swine Flu were moving into high gear, 
conservative Fox News commentator Glen Beck informed his roughly 3 million viewers that, 
with respect the vaccine, “you don’t know if this is going to cause neurological damage like it 
did in the 1970s,” adding that he would do “the exact opposite” of what the federal government 
recommended, and might even attend a swine flu party in order to deliberately infect himself 
before the virus could mutate (LA Times 2009). A week later, on October 7
th, conservative 
commentator, Rush Limbaugh told his radio audience – estimated at around 20 million listeners 
per week
1 (Boehlert 2009) -- “I am not going to take it [the H1N1 vaccine], precisely because 
you are now telling me I must…I don’t want to take your vaccine. I don’t get flu shots. He added 
if “you have some idiot government official demanding, telling me I must take this vaccine, I’ll 
never take it.” 
Taking a different tack, two Republican House Members – both doctors – raised 
objections to the pandemic funding included in a defense supplemental bill. Rep. Phil Gingrey 
(R-GA) commented, “We can’t let all of our spending and our reaction be media-driven in 
responding to a panic so that we don’t get Katrina-ed. ... It’s important because what we are 
talking about as we discuss the appropriateness of spending $2 billion to produce a vaccine that 
may never be used — that is a very important decision that our country has to make.” Rep. Paul 
Broun (R-GA) added, “I don’t think we need to spend $1.5 billion on flu vaccine when ... the 
research shows that it’s not going to be very virulent. ... We are stealing our grandchildren’s 
future by borrowing and spending. ... This hysteria over the flu is driving the media, and it’s 
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1 Estimates of Limbaugh’s audience magnitude vary from 2 to 50 million listeners per week 
(Boehlert 2009). Pew’s Project for Excellence in Journalism rates his audience in Spring 2009 at 
about 15 million (www.stateofthemedia.org), compared to 14 million for Sean Hannity. 	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driving the administration, driving the leadership here. We’ve got to stop that.” More recently, 
Fox News business commentator David Asman expressed skepticism regarding the safety of the 
swine flu vaccine, and criticized the government for having exaggerated the threat (Media 
Matters 2010).
  
Though much of the criticism of the H1N1 vaccine and the government’s response to the 
emergence of the virus came from the right, such concerns also appeared on the other end of the 
political spectrum. Notably, liberal talk show host Bill Maher Tweeted “people who get flu shots 
are idiots” and commented, in an interview with former Republican Senate Majority Leader and 
heart surgeon Bill Frist, “Why would you let them [the government] be the ones to stick a 
disease into your arm? I would never get a swine flu vaccine or any vaccine. I don’t trust the 
government, especially with my health” (Parker-Pope 2009). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the skepticism voiced by prominent politicians and 
commentators, combined with pre-existing skepticism about vaccination and immunization 
programs in general, many Americans – roughly half according to an October 2009 Pew Center 
survey – indicated that they did not plan to seek the H1N1 vaccine. Such figures worried public 
health officials who feared that the H1N1 virus could unleash a potentially devastating pandemic. 
A somewhat less well-known, but potentially even more troubling, pattern emerged in the same 
survey: Democrats were nearly 50% more likely than Republicans (60 vs. 41%) to indicate that 
they would take the vaccine (Schlesinger 2009).  
What accounts for this stark partisan gap over a seemingly non-partisan topic? And does 
it hold potentially broader public health implications? In assessing the first question, the most 
obvious proximate explanation is that Republican partisans were merely responding to trusted 
(i.e., conservative and Republican) opinion leaders, who voiced greater skepticism of the vaccine 	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
(and of the seriousness of the threat in general) than their Democratic counterparts, as the 
opening anecdotes suggest.  
This, of course, begs the question of why Republican elites would be more skeptical than 
Democratic elites. Several potential explanations immediately come to mind. First, Republicans 
tend to be more skeptical than Democrats of proactive government intervention in public life. 
The Obama Administration’s push to promote near universal H1N1 vaccinations constituted a 
major government intervention in the private lives of citizens. Second, the messenger in this case 
– the Obama Administration – was more credible, all else equal, to Democrats than Republicans, 
simply by virtue of its partisan affiliation, while for the same reason skeptical Republican elites 
were more credible to Republican partisans. Third, greater Republican skepticism of 
international institutions, like the World Health Organization, further weakened the credibility of 
the pro-vaccination message to Republicans, relative to Democrats, who tend to be more trusting 
of global institutions (Page and Bouton 2006, Holsti 2004, Baum and Nau 2009).  
Finally, Republicans and Democrats increasingly expose themselves to distinct 
information streams via the new media. The streams favored by Republicans, such as the Fox 
News Channel on cable, as well as conservative talk radio and Internet sites, may have been 
more critical of the swine flu vaccination program -- due to the first three explanations noted 
above -- than their liberal analogs preferred by Democrats. Such a pattern could, in turn, shape 
vaccination patterns in ways that hold profound implications for public policy and public health. 
In this paper I assess the relationship between political partisanship and attitudes and 
behavior with respect to the Swine Flu crisis of 2009 in general, and the U.S. mass vaccination 
program in particular. I argue that even seemingly non-partisan political issues like public health 	 ﾠ 4	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are increasingly characterized by partisan polarization in public attitudes, and that such 
polarization is in part attributable to the breakdown of the information commons that 
characterized the American mass media from roughly the 1950s until the early 1990s. In its place 
has arisen an increasingly fragmented and niche-oriented media marketplace in which 
individuals are better able to limit their information exposure to attitudes and opinions that 
reinforce, rather than challenge, their preexisting beliefs. 
I begin, in the next section, by reviewing the changing media landscape over the past 
several decades. I then relate the patterns to polarization in partisan political attitudes and 
behavior with respect to the Swine Flu in general, and the vaccination program in particular. 
The Changing Media Marketplace 
The decline of the traditional news media since the early 1990s is well documented and 
widely reported (Baum and Kernell 1999 & 2007, Hamilton 2003, Baum 2003). The combined 
ratings for the evening newscasts of the “big three” broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) 
have fallen from about 52 million viewers in 1980 to 22.3 million in 2009 (Pew 2010). Indeed, 
according to a 2008 survey (Pew Center 2008), the percent of Americans indicating that they 
regularly watch cable news now exceeds the percentage regularly watching network news (by 39 
to 29%).  
Not only has the overall audience for network news declined dramatically, but the 
demographics of network news viewers have also shifted starkly. Where the typical network 
news viewer was once comparable to the median television viewer (after all, the networks 
enjoyed an oligopoloy from the 1950s to the 1980s), by 2008 the network audience was notably 
older (with a median age of 61.3 (Pew 2009) and, according to the Pew Center (2008), composed 	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of more than twice as many Democrats as Republicans (45 vs. 22% “regular” viewers).  
The so-called new media, by which I refer primarily to cable news channels and the 
Internet, but also to political talk radio, differ in important ways from their traditional media 
cousins. Most notably, nearly all such outlets self-consciously seek to appeal to relatively narrow, 
and hence more loyal niches of the public. Rather than seeking to be all things to all people – as 
the major networks did during their heyday – new media outlets try to provide a product that 
more closely fits the preferences of a particular subset of the public.  
In news and politics, the primary dimension upon which new media outlets have sought 
to differentiate themselves is ideology. Most notably, in 2010 there are prominent cable news 
channels aimed primarily at liberals (MSNBC), conservatives (Fox), and moderates (CNN). 
Similarly, on the Internet, the political blogosphere is dominated by ideologically narrow 
websites like Huffingtonpost.com on the left and Michellemalkin.com on the right. Political talk 
radio, in turn, is dominated by conservative voices like Beck, Hannity and Limbaugh, though 
there are some liberal niches, such as a program hosted by MSNBC analyst Ed Schultz. As the 
range of options available to consumers seeking political information has expanded, making 
available media environments that closely match their personal political preferences, audiences 
have increasingly availed themselves of the opportunity to self-select into ideologically friendly 
political news environments. 
Cable News 
Figure 1 shows the trend, from 2000 to 2008-09 in the partisan make-up of audiences for 
CNN, Fox, and MSNBC. These data are derived from pooled national surveys conducted by a 
market research firm (Scarborough), representing over 100,000 interviews for each period 	 ﾠ 6	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included in the graphic (Kernell and Rice 2010, Feltus 2009). 
[Figure 1 here] 
The curves in Figure 1 indicate that in 2000, the audiences for all three networks 
consisted of fairly similar proportions of Democrats and Republicans. The partisan gaps for 
viewers of CNN, Fox, and MSNBC were 4, 8, and 2 percentage points, respectively. By 2008-09, 
these gaps had expanded dramatically, to 30, 20, and 27 points, for CNN, Fox, and MSNBC, 
respectively. While it is certainly the case that some partisan overlap remains (Feltus 2009, Prior 
2007, Kernell and Rice 2010, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) -- these data clearly suggest a fairly 
strong tendency toward partisan filtering on cable news.
2 
Internet 
If niche programming has emerged as an important competitive strategy for television 
news, it is arguably the most consequential such strategy on the Internet. Research (Hindman 
2007) has shown that a stunningly small number of political news-oriented outlets dominate 
news and public affairs traffic on the web. While some of the most heavily trafficked sites – such 
as CNN.com, MSNBC.com, and Yahoo News -- remain predominantly audience aggregators 
rather than disaggregators -- and collectively make up 27% of the top news sites (Pew 2009) -- 
the political blogosphere functions primarily as an arena for partisan and ideological self-
selection.  
There are a variety of well-documented digital divides online, including by age, gender, 
race, and socio-economic status. Some – particularly gender and race -- have receded somewhat 
in recent years. In each case, the net effect is that some Americans are systematically more likely 
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2 For additional data on partisan filtering of cable news audiences, see Baum (forthcoming). 	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than others to rely upon the Internet for political news. Many of these divides are exogenous to 
the preferences and policies of individual Internet outlets. However, political ideology remains a 
key proactive filter that political news websites in general, and blogs in particular, frequently 
employ in seeking to build a loyal niche audience. 
Along these lines, Baum and Groeling (2008, 2010) report that left-leaning political blogs, 
like DailyKos.com are disproportionately likely to cover news that favors Democrats over 
Republicans, while right-leaning blogs, like FreeRepublic.com are disproportionately likely to 
feature news favorable to Republicans over Democrats. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the 
ideological and partisan slant on political blogs, users of these sites are, on average, more likely 
than typical Americans to prefer news that reinforces their pre-existing preferences, more likely 
to discuss political news with family and friends (Baum and Groeling 2008) and, as shown in 
Figure 2,
3 more ideologically extreme.
  
[Figure 2 here] 
Not surprisingly, the audiences for such outlets are highly skewed based on party 
affiliation. For instance, according to an April 2007 Nielsen report (All 2007), 77% of 
HuffingtonPost.com readers were registered Democrats, and only 3.8% were registered 
Republicans. While, as with cable news, some Internet consumers seek out news from across the 
ideological spectrum -- and some evidence (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) suggests they do so to 
a greater extent on the Internet than on cable  – the Internet is nonetheless a particularly 
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3 Source: Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project survey (CCAP 2008). In Figure 2, 
0=moderate, 1=liberal or conservative, and 2=very liberal or very conservative (Source: CCAP 
2008). 	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
amenable environment for ideological self-selection, and the aforementioned evidence from 
political blogs suggests that many politically oriented news consumers engage in such self-
imposed ideological segregation.
4 
While the audience for political news on the Internet does not yet match that for 
television news (Baum and Groeling 2008), it is growing rapidly and is by no means trivial. For 
instance, according to an October 2010 comScore.com press release, in September 2008 the total 
number of unique visitors to the top 15 political blog sites was approximately 206 million. This 
represents about a 10% increase over the prior year. According to Pew Center data, in turn, in 
2010 41% of respondents identified the Internet as their primary source of news, compared to 
66% who identified Television. This represents the smallest television advantage ever recorded 
in Pew Center surveys. According to the same data, among Americans under age 30, the Internet 
is now the predominant source of news, beating out television by 13 percentage points (65 to 
52%) (Pew 2011). 
Political Talk Radio 
In	 ﾠone	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠradio	 ﾠis	 ﾠanything	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ“new.”	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
populist	 ﾠradio	 ﾠdates	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠFather	 ﾠCharles	 ﾠCaughlin	 ﾠwho,	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠDepression,	 ﾠ
railed	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠFranklin	 ﾠRoosevelt	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNew	 ﾠDeal,	 ﾠto	 ﾠracial	 ﾠand	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠ
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4 Along these lines, Baum and Groeling (2009) report evidence that some ideological news blogs 
cover the “other side” primarily to set the stage for making their own political argument, in effect 
using “opposition” political blogs as strawmen. It seems likely that at least some politically 
sophisticated Internet news consumers are similarly motivated when “crossing over” to 
ideologically hostile news sources. 	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minorities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠJews.	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠawkward	 ﾠfit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
category	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“new	 ﾠmedia.”	 ﾠThat	 ﾠsaid,	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠradio	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠrespects	 ﾠpredates	 ﾠother	 ﾠforms	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
media	 ﾠin	 ﾠtargeting	 ﾠniche	 ﾠaudiences	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠniche	 ﾠaudiences	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Hence,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwarrants	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠmention	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
According	 ﾠto	 ﾠPew’s	 ﾠstateofthemedia.org	 ﾠwebsite,	 ﾠ12	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ15	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠ
radio	 ﾠhosts	 ﾠin	 ﾠFall	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠwere	 ﾠconservative,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnone	 ﾠwere	 ﾠliberal.	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠ
liberal	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠshow	 ﾠhost,	 ﾠEd	 ﾠSchultz,	 ﾠattracted	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ2.5	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠlisteners	 ﾠper	 ﾠday	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠ
down	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ3	 ﾠmillion	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠ1/6th	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaudience	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
conservative	 ﾠtalkers	 ﾠRush	 ﾠLimbaugh	 ﾠor	 ﾠSean	 ﾠHannity.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠ
liberal	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠcrack	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmost	 ﾠnotably	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAir	 ﾠAmerica	 ﾠRadio	 ﾠ
Network,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdeclared	 ﾠbankruptcy	 ﾠand	 ﾠceased	 ﾠbroadcasting	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠradio	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠa	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconservative	 ﾠpopulism	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠof	 ﾠFather	 ﾠCaughlin. 
Back to the Future? 
Though in some ways unique, the current period is by no means the first time in 
American politics that partisan media have played an important role in public policy debates. 
Rather, viewed in a broader context, overwhelmingly nonpartisan journalism, as we saw in 
roughly the first four decades following World War II, appears to have been an historical 
anomaly. 
To better understand the implications of our increasingly polarized information 
environment, it is helpful to consider the partisan press of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In that era, citizens who wanted an accurate picture of the political landscape could 
read multiple newspapers with differing partisan loyalties in order to triangulate on the “truth” 	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
(Schudson 1981, Baum and Groeling 2010).
5 Such a strategy could offset to some extent any 
potentially harmful effects of partisan-oriented media. Yet the question remains as to whether 
typical citizens in the contemporary period, faced with far more varied alternatives, are likely to 
embrace a triangulation approach to news consumption. The present differs from the past in 
numerous important respects, not least of which is the explosion in the twenty-first century of 
entertainment mass media and other competitors for scarce public attention. 
While it may be the case that politically attentive Americans in the twenty-first century 
are proportionately similar in number to their counterparts in prior news eras, a far larger portion 
of the contemporary population enjoys and exercises the franchise than was the case in the 
nineteenth-century. Moreover, the ability of party organizations to reliably direct the voting of 
their members has declined with the death of party machines and the waning influence of state 
party bosses. Consequently, the breadth of consensus necessary to forge a bipartisan accord is far 
greater in the twenty-first century, and modern communication and polling technology allows 
nervous politicians to sense precisely when that consensus is eroding. Of course, gaining consent 
first requires capturing public attention, and even politically attentive citizens are unlikely to be 
able to attend to all of the competing messages in the modern media environment.  
Not only is it possible to consume nearly limitless political news from virtually any 
ideological perspective, it is also possible to consume equally limitless entertainment media, 
while rarely if ever encountering politics (Prior 2007). This raises the opportunity costs for 
typical consumers of seeking out alternative political perspectives. Survey evidence suggests that 
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5 For example, in their famous “Middletown” study of what they regarded as a typical American 
city in the 1920s, Robert and Helen Lynd (1929, 471) found that “The local morning paper 
distributes 8,851 copies to the 9,200 homes of the city, and the afternoon paper 6,715, plus at 
least half of an additional 785 sold on the street and news-stand. In addition, the circulation of 
out-of-town-papers . . . now totals 1200 to 1500 a day.”  	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substantial portions of the public also appear to lack the motive to do so. Not surprisingly, these 
same data indicate that as the strength of an individual’s political ideology increases, so too does 
that individual’s preference for news that reinforces her pre-existing beliefs (recall Figure 2) 
(Baum and Groeling 2010). 
If the new media environment is characterized more by reinforcement seeking than by 
triangulation, forging and sustaining bipartisan consensus around even seemingly non-partisan 
issues like flu vaccination programs will likely prove a daunting and perhaps all but 
insurmountable task for future leaders. Evidence of this dilemma emerges in public reactions to 
the 2003 U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, a conflict that produced the greatest 
partisan divide ever recorded in scientific polling, both in terms of support for a U.S. military 
conflict and in terms of overall presidential approval (Jacobson 2006). Scholars (e.g., Kull, 
Ramsey and Lewis 2003, Della Vigna and Kaplan 2003, Jacobson 2007) continue to debate the 
media’s role in sharpening, if not altogether producing, the partisan gulf in evaluations of the 
president and the Iraq War. Jacobson (2007), for instance, speculates that a combination of 
differences in content and partisan self-selection into friendly news environments -- such as Fox 
for Republicans and conservatives, PBS, MSNBC, and CNN for Democrats and liberals, and 
network news for independents and moderates -- may have contributed to partisan differences in 
perceptions of the war and the president leading it. 
As the prior discussion attests, self-selection, a concept dating back to Campbell and 
colleagues’ (1960) theory of minimalism, may well be sharpening partisan polarization, and this 
phenomenon seems likely to expand in the future. However, there exists a second, perhaps 
complementary, culprit: ideologically driven credibility assessments. In other words, 
contemporary citizens possess, arguably to a greater extent than their predecessors, the means to 	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engage in a multipronged dissonance-avoidance strategy. Selective exposure, or avoiding 
dissonant information altogether, presumably represents the first such prong. However, even 
when this first defense mechanism fails and individuals are exposed to ideologically hostile news, 
they increasingly possess the means -- by assigning ideological reputations to individual sources 
and media outlets -- to systematically discount it. In other words, consumers appear also to 
selectively accept or reject information to which they are exposed based on its perceived 
credibility (Baum and Groeling 2010). Credibility assessments in turn depend on the perceived 
ideological leaning of the outlet presenting the information, as well as on the content of the 
information itself (e.g., its perceived costliness). The combined influence of selective exposure 
and acceptance appears, at least in the cases of Iraq and overall assessments of President Bush’s 
job performance, to have contributed substantially to then historically unprecedented levels of 
partisan polarization during President Bush’s second term and more recently in President Barack 
Obama’s second year in office. This leads consumers toward what I term Self-Segregated 
Information Streams. This, in turn, contributes to the progressive erosion of what might be 
thought of as the informational commons; that is, the common civic (virtual) space, occupied for 
roughly four decades by network television nightly newscasts, where a broad cross-section of 
Americans gathered to learn about the events of the day.  
But to what extent to the patterns identified herein, and resulting Self-Segregated 
Information Streams, shape public perceptions of, and responses to, the 2009 Swine Flu 
pandemic and subsequent vaccination program? It is to this question that I now turn. 
Partisan Polarization and the Flu 
When news of the H1N1 virus, commonly known as Swine Flu, first hit the U.S. media, 	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Americans across the political spectrum focused intensely on the issue. As shown in Figure 3, in 
the first Pew Center News Interest Index survey to include a question on the Swine Flu – 
conducted in late April 2009 -- 91% of Republicans, 89% of Democrats, and 87% of 
Independents indicated that they were following the issue “very” or “fairly” closely. These data 
suggest that at least initially there was no partisan gap in attention to the Swine Flu story. 
[Figure 3 here] 
This near-universal interest rapidly dissolved; within a week, a second Pew survey found 
Democrats 12 percentage points more likely than Republicans to report following the flu story 
very or fairly closely, a gap that recurred in 13 of 15 Pew Center surveys that included the 
question between May and December 2009. The gap peaked at 18 percentage points in 
November 2009. In that same November survey, Republicans were nearly 2.5 times more likely 
(49 vs. 21%) to believe that news reports were overstating the danger of the Swine Flu. This 
partisan gap further expands – from 28 to 34 percentage points (39 vs. 5%) -- when we limit the 
sample to respondents who indicated that they were following the Swine Flu story very closely.  
Returning to the October survey cited at the outset of the study, which found Democrats 
far more likely than Republican to indicate that they would get the H1N1 vaccine if available, 
nearly twice as many Democrats as Republicans (82 vs. 49%) expressed confidence in the 
government’s ability to deal with the Swine Flu. Moreover, nearly twice as many Republicans as 
Democrats (18 vs. 10%) indicated (in an open-ended question) that they would not get the 
vaccine because it was too risky or inadequately tested. Among Republicans who report 
following the swine flu issue more closely than any of the other issues in the news included in 
the survey, the percentage indicating that they would not get the flu vaccine because it was too 	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risky swells to 26%. The corresponding percentage among Democrats varies hardly at all as 
attention to the Swine Flu issue rises. 
Interestingly, these percentages far exceed the roughly 4 and 5% of Republicans and 
Democrats, respectively, who indicated that they would not get the vaccine because the Swine 
Flu risk had been exaggerated. These percentages remain nearly constant for Democrats or 
Republicans regardless of their level of attention to the issue. This latter justification seems on its 
face more clearly attributable a general distrust of the government, which, as noted, was far more 
prevalent among Republicans, presumably due to the presence of a polarizing Democrat in the 
White House combined with generally lower levels of faith in government among Republicans.  
That said, in a May 2009 Gallup poll, the correlations between approval of President 
Obama’s job performance and expressing an intent to get the H1N1 vaccine when available, on 
the one hand, and believing the media were exaggerating the danger associated with the Swine 
Flu, on the other, were only about .10 and -.02, respectively, among Republicans (compared 
to .01 and -.06, respectively, among Democrats). The correlations among Republicans change 
only modestly when we limit the sample to self-described conservative Republicans (.09 and .03, 
respectively). This suggests that while general Republican or conservative distrust of government, 
or of a Democratic president, almost certainly accounts for part of these differences, it is 
insufficient to fully account for these patterns. 
Why then would those respondents most attentive to the Swine Flu story be most likely to 
diverge in their opinions about it, with nearly all highly attentive Democrats believing the story 
was either being covered appropriately or that the media were understating the danger, while 
nearly 40% of attentive Republicans held the opposing view? Why, in turn, were Republicans 	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less trusting of the government’s capacity to deal with the flue epidemic and more likely to 
worry that the vaccine itself was dangerous, especially if they were paying close attention to the 
issue, while variations in attentiveness had almost no effect on Democrats? In the next section, I 
argue that the explanation lies, at least in part, in the different information streams to which 
Republicans and Democrats exposed themselves, and from which they received starkly varying 
messages – both in terms of quantity and valence – on the Swine Flu in general, and the 
vaccination program in particular. 
News Consumption and Attitudes Toward the Swine Flu 
I have been unable to identify any surveys asking respondents in detail their sources of 
news about the Swine Flu and vaccine. However, several surveys include questions on attitudes 
regarding H1N1 or the vaccine and general categories of news sources about the flu (e.g., cable, 
internet, national TV, etc.). These data allow some suggestive, albeit far from definitive, tests of 
the hypothesis that the different information streams preferred by Democrats and Republicans in 
the new media help account for the partisan gap in attitudes regarding the pandemic. 
The previously mentioned May 2009 Pew Center survey asked respondents how worried 
they were that they or a family member would be exposed to the flu. Responses ranged from “not 
worried at all” to “very worried.” The survey included the aforementioned question asking about 
respondents’ primary sources of news about the Swine Flu. My hypothesis anticipates greater 
partisan polarization in worry over the flu among new media consumers than among consumers 
of traditional news sources, where all viewers are exposed to more similar information stream. 
To test this prediction, I divided the media outlets included in the question into two 
categories, with cable TV, Internet, and radio counted as “new media” and Local TV news, 	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national network TV news, morning TV news shows, and newspapers counted as traditional 
news sources. A ttest indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood 
that Democrats or Republicans who rely primarily on traditional news sources will be “very” or 
“somewhat” worried about the flu. Conversely, among respondents who indicated that they 
relied primarily on new media sources Democrats were 11 percentage points more likely than 
Republicans to express worry over the Swine Flu (.40 vs. .29). This partisan gap is statistically 
significant at p<.02. If we exclude radio from the new media category, which is then limited to 
cable and the Internet, the gap expands to 13 percentage points (.41 vs. .28, p<.02).  
Two additional sets of ttests offer further evidence that media consumption is linked to 
attitudes regarding the dangers of Swine Flu. The first compares whether Democrats and 
Republicans who do or do not report relying on new media sources for news about the flu 
believe the media are offering too much vs. too little Swine-Flu-related news. Among traditional 
news-oriented respondents, Democrats were a little more than 13 percentage points less likely 
than Republicans (.268 vs. .402, p<.03) to believe the media were offering too much swine flu 
news. The partisan gap is far larger (.24 percentage points) among new media consumers (.37 
v. .61, p<.001). The results are comparable when we substitute a question asking respondents 
how they would rate the quality of news coverage of swine flu, with Republicans again being 
significantly more likely than Democrats to rate press coverage poorly, particularly if they relied 
on new media sources for news about the pandemic.  Fully 83 and 77 percent of Democratic 
traditional and new media reliant consumers, respectively, rated press coverage positively, 
compared to only .61 and .48 percent of Republicans. The difference between new and 
traditional news consumers is insignificant among Democrats, while among Republicans the gap 
is significant at p<.03. 	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Attitudes regarding the quality of media coverage of Swine Flu, in turn, influence the 
extent of respondents’ concern about it. For instance, among Republicans who rate press 
coverage of the flu positively, there is no significant difference in concern over the flu between 
those who report relying on traditional vs. new media sources for flu-related information (.34 
vs. .40). However, among Republicans who rate press coverage of the flu negatively, a large (21 
percentage point, p<.01) gap emerges between those who report relying on new vs. traditional 
media sources for flue-related news, with new media consumers reporting far lower levels of 
concern about the flu. Nearly all of that gap, in turn, results from a 23 percentage point drop 
among new-media-reliant consumers as they move from positive to negative attitudes regarding 
the quality of press coverage of the flu story.  
In sharp contrast, no significant gaps emerge among Democrats. This, again, seems likely 
attributable to the propensity of Democrats to seek out news sources via news media that are 
relatively sympathetic to the Administration’s representation of the Swine Flu pandemic as a 
major emergency. Moreover, traditional news sources (like network newscasts) are, all else equal, 
highly likely to highlight the Administration’s perspective in a crisis, due to its status as the most 
authoritative information source, especially early in the crisis, as was the case at time of this 
survey (Baum and Groeling 2008 & 2010).  
Finally, it is worth noting that among both groups of partisans who rate press coverage 
positively, relying on new media sources for flu news is associated with higher levels of concern, 
while among those who rate coverage poorly, reliance on new media sources is associated with 
lower levels of concern about the flu (though these latter differences are not statistically 
significant, and hence must be interpreted with caution).  	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These results suggest that when given the opportunity to self-select into ideologically 
“friendly” media environments – as is far more likely in the new than in the traditional media – 
partisans are likely to diverge fairly starkly in their attitudes toward the pandemic. However, 
when confronted with a common information stream – as in the traditional news media – they 
respond by converging in their attitudes, regardless of partisanship. Moreover, the fact that 
attitudes regarding press coverage of the Swine Flu story appear closely correlated with news 
source selection, which in turn appears closely related to concern over the flu, with each 
relationship heavily mediated by party affiliation, represents further suggestive evidence in favor 
of the Self-segregated Information Stream hypothesis.   
Unfortunately, data limitations in this survey make it impossible to rule out the possibility 
that differences in the internal characteristics – such as ideological extremeness -- of new vs. 
traditional news viewing Republicans or Democrats may account for these patterns. After all, as I 
have already shown (recall Figure 3), strength of ideology is positively associated with preferring 
news that reinforces one’s preexisting beliefs. So it is doubtless the case that stronger partisans 
are more prone to self-select into ideologically “friendly” information environments than are 
weaker partisans, which in turn seems likely to steer them toward new media outlets, which tend 
to be more amenable to such self-selection. That said, it is worth noting that these results do not 
appear to derive from differences in overall interest in or attention to the flu across new vs. 
traditional news consumers. There is no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of 
having followed the Swine Flu story most closely among the six major news items included in 
the survey for either Democrats or Republicans who reported relying primarily on new vs. 
traditional news media sources for flu-related news.  
If it is the case that respondents who prefer new media sources for news about the swine 	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flu do so because they are, on average, more partisan or more ideologically extreme – with new 
media-oriented Republicans being more conservative and new media-oriented Democrats more 
liberal than their traditional-news-consuming counterparts -- then such a preference might also 
predict similar differences in attention to other news stories, particularly those with clear partisan 
implications. To test this possibility, I conducted two ttests: one employing two non-overtly 
partisan news issues issues (the financial problems of the US auto industry and the state of the 
economy) and one employing two more directly partisan issues (President Obama’s first 100 
days in office and to Senator Arlen Spector’s switch from the Republican to the Democratic 
Party). For the less-partisan issues, I found, as expected, comparably small and insignificant 
differences for both parties. That is, preferring new over traditional media sources for news about 
the swine flu does not predict differences in attention to the financial woes of the American auto 
industry or the economy, regardless of party.  
For the more overtly partisan issues, Republican new media consumers reported having 
followed the stories 6% more closely (2.76 vs. 2.60 on the 1-4 scale), on average, than their 
traditional-news-viewing counterparts. This gap, though nearly significant, is substantively quite 
small. This, in combination with the fact that virtually no gap at all emerged among Democrats, 
suggests that a preference for new media sources for swine flu news – here employed as a 
possible indicator of ex ante strength of partisanship or ideology – does not appear clearly 
associated with the decision to consume new vs. traditional news media. 
Somewhat more direct evidence in this regard is available from a May/June 2009 Pew 
Global Values Survey, which included several questions with clear ideological implications, 
along with questions about the Swine Flu and news sources. In this instance, the survey asked 
whether respondents primary source of national or international news was television, radio, 	 ﾠ 20	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Internet, newspapers or magazines. Because television is not divided into cable vs. broadcast, 
while the “radio” category is obviously not necessarily limited to political talk radio, the status of 
these outlets as new vs. traditional media is ambiguous. However, I find substantively tiny and 
statistically insignificant differences in the self-reported ideological extremeness
6 of respondents 
who rely on television, radio or the Internet for national or international news.  
That said, a ttest on the extent to which respondents indicate they are worried that either 
they or a family member will be exposed to Swine Flu
7, finds that Democrats who primarily rely 
on the Internet or TV for national or international news are significantly more worried about 
Swine Flu than their Republican counterparts, even when I exclude strong ideologues (that is, 
respondents describing themselves as “very conservative” or “very liberal”). The partisan gaps, 
with strong ideologues excluded, are .39 (p<.02) and .32 (p<.001) points on the 1-4 scale, or .35 
and .29 standard deviations for Internet and TV news consumers, respectively. The 
corresponding partisan gap for respondents who indicated that they rely primarily on newspapers 
or magazines (more traditional sources with less opportunity for ideologically-based self-
selection) for their news was far smaller (.14, or .13 standard deviations) and statistically 
insignificant, again with strong ideologues excluded.
8 The results differ only modestly when 
ideologues are included in the ttests. Similar patterns emerge if I exclude respondents who 
indicated in a separate question that they had either “no confidence at all” (in one test) or “a lot 
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6 This is based on a question asking respondents about their political ideology, recoded to a 0-3 
scale, where 0=moderate or “don’t know”, 1=liberal or conservative, and 2=very liberal or very 
conservative. 
7 Response options were: 3=very worried, 2=somewhat worried, 1=not too worried, or 0=not at 
all worried. Those who indicated they were “exposed already” were excluded, while “don’t 
know” responses were recoded to the center of the scale (1.5). 
8 Too few respondents identified radio as their primary news source to include it as a separate 
new media category. For the same reason I combine newspaper- and magazine-oriented 
respondents, though the results are similar if I isolate the newspaper category (too few 
respondents chose magazines to allow a separate ttest of that category). 	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of confidence” (in a second test) that President Barack Obama would “do the right thing 
regarding world affairs,” or if I exclude respondents who indicated, in another question, that they 
did not approve of President Obama’s international policies.
9 This suggests that, while ex ante 
ideological extremeness or attitudes toward President Obama, and the effects of those attitudes 
on media outlet choice, almost certainly influence the observed partisan gaps, they cannot, by 
themselves, fully account for them. Seemingly, the information to which respondents expose 
themselves in these various media also matters. 
One final test offers additional evidence substantiating this assertion. A 23-26 October 
2009 Pew Center survey asked respondents which news stories they were following most closely 
as well as their “regular” sources of news. The question listed six specific news story options as 
well as an “other story” category. Response options for the latter question, that in this survey 
(unlike the others) were not mutually exclusive, included local TV news, national network TV 
news, MSNBC, FOX, CNN, radio news, newspapers, or the Internet. I conducted a set of ttests 
to determine whether self-identified conservative Republicans differed in their propensity to 
identify Swine Flu as the issue they had followed most closely in the news during the previous 
week, depending on whether or not they identified Fox News as a regular source of news. I then 
compared the results for Swine Flu with those for several other news stories identified in the 
survey, including the health care debate, the state of the national economy, efforts by the Obama 
Administration to place limits on executive pay for companies that took bailout funds, the war in 
Afghanistan, and political instability in Pakistan.  
Beginning with the “other” news stories, the results indicate that there is no statistically 
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9 In this instance, too few respondents (29% and 6% of Democrats) expressed disapproval to 
isolate that category for a separate ttest of partisan differences. 	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significant attention difference between conservative Republican Fox viewers and their non-Fox-
viewing counterparts with respect to the economy, executive pay, or Afghanistan. Too few 
conservative Republicans mentioned Pakistan to determine whether or not viewers and non-
viewers differed meaningfully. Finally, regular Fox viewers were 18 percentage points more 
likely than non-regular-viewers to cite the health care debate as the issue they had followed most 
closely in the news (p=.05).  
The results for Swine Flu are far starker. Conservative Republicans who did not cite Fox 
News as a regular news source were more than twice as likely as those that did mention Fox to 
name Swine Flu and the vaccine as the issue they had followed most closely (.40 vs. .18, p<.003). 
Equally important, this relationship is unique to Fox News, at least in its magnitude and 
significance. No statistically relationships emerged for local TV news or newspapers. However, 
conservative Republicans who cited national network news as a regular news source were 10 
percentage points more likely than their counterparts who did not to name Swine Flu and the 
vaccine issue as the story they had followed most closely the prior week (.30 vs. .20, p<.10).  
Several of the other “new” media outlets – including CNN and radio news -- were also 
associated with reduced attention to Swine Flu. Regular radio news consumers were about 7 
percentage points less likely than non-radio-news-consumers to indicate that they had followed 
the Swine Flu/vaccine issue most closely, though this effect is not statistically significant. The 
corresponding drop in attention for regular CNN viewers is about 12 percentage points (.28 
vs. .16, p<.10).  If I limit the sample to respondents who identified themselves as “very 
conservative,” then regular Internet consumption is associated with a 7 percentage point, albeit 
statistically insignificant (p<.19) decline in the likelihood of having followed Swine Flu and its 
vaccine most closely of the issues in the news the prior week (.18 vs. .11). 	 ﾠ 23	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The fact that other new media did not produce attention effects vis-à-vis Swine Flu and 
the vaccine comparable in magnitude or significance to that associated with Fox likely stems 
from several factors, including (a) Fox’s status as a particular focal point for conservative 
Republican news consumers, (b) in some instances, the specificity of Fox News relative to, say, 
“radio news” in the survey question, the latter of which presumably includes political talk radio, 
but also other less politically slanted fare, and, perhaps most important, (c) the fact that 
respondents were able to select as many of the outlets from the list as they liked. This means that 
some of the Fox consumers almost certainly also exposed themselves to other media, like 
national network news or local TV news, potentially offering somewhat different messages 
regarding the Swine Flu and the vaccine program. 
In sharp contrast to the patterns for conservative Republicans, among self-described 
liberal Democrats no statistically significant differences between regular Fox viewers and non-
viewers emerged for any of the news stories. The same pattern emerges among liberal Democrats 
across all the media outlets included in the survey, with the sole exception of local TV news. 
Liberal Democrats who regularly watch local TV news were 18 percentage points more likely 
(.34 vs. .16, p<.05) than their counterparts who did not regularly watch to report following the 
Swine Flu/vaccine issue most closely. Presumably, the weaker relationships for liberal 
Democrats stem from the aforementioned higher ex ante levels of interest in the issue among 
Democrats and greater trust of the government officials and agencies talking about it. That said, 
when I limit the analysis to self-described “very liberal” respondents, the results strengthen 
considerably for national network news and MSNBC. In the former case, regular viewing of 
network news among very liberal respondents is associated with a 24 percentage point increase 
in the likelihood of having followed Swine Flu and its vaccine most closely during the prior 	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week (.42 vs. .18, p<.05). The corresponding increase among regular MSNBC viewers is 9 
percentage points (.35 vs. .26). However, this latter relationship is statistically insignificant 
(p<.25), presumably do to the fairly small number of regular MSNBC consumers included in the 
survey. 
These results clearly suggest that regularly consuming Fox News had quite different 
effects on the attention of conservative Republicans to Swine Flu and the vaccine than with 
respect to any of the other policy issues on the national agenda, substantially reducing their 
interest in the issue. Other new media mostly exhibited similar, albeit weaker effects. In contrast, 
network news consumption produced the opposite effect, at least among especially conservative 
respondents. Fewer significant relationships emerged among liberal Democrats, regardless of 
their sources of news, though several outlets typically preferred by liberals were associated with 
positive attention effects among “very liberal” respondents.
10 Taken together, these patterns 
appear largely to supports the Self-segregated Information Stream hypothesis. 
Thus far, we have seen suggestive evidence that the trend toward increasing self-selection 
by Americans into politically “friendly” news environments, especially in the new media (cable, 
Internet, political talk radio, and especially Fox News) may help account for the partisan gap in 
concern over the Swine Flue and in self-reported intent to seek the Swine Flu vaccine. Of course, 
survey questions regarding interest or “intent” are not equivalent to actual behavior. Hence, in 
the next section I investigate state-level data on swine flu vaccination rates to see whether the 
sorts of patterns identified in the survey data reflect actual behavior. 
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10 While, in order to address the endogeneity concern raised earlier, I focused in this instance on 
“liberal Democrats” and “conservative Republicans,” many of the patterns identified above, 
particularly with respect to Fox News, remain similar if I limit the analysis to liberals, 
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A Vaccination Gap? 
To investigate actual patterns of vaccinations for Swine Flu, and determine whether there is 
evidence that political partisanship influences vaccination rates in part due to the different 
information streams to which partisans expose themselves, I turn to state-level CDC data on 
H1N1 immunizations and deaths from Swine Flu.
11 To account for partisan differences, I employ 
Gallup data on the on the gap in party affiliation in each state in 2008, as well as on whether each 
state voted for Obama or McCain in 2008 (Jones 2009). The best-available proxy I was able to 
identify for the differing media streams consumed by residents of each state is a data set 
developed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) on partisan bias in newspapers. Gentzkow and 
Shapiro rated 434 U.S. newspapers on a left-to-right ideological continuum, with the number of 
papers for an individual state ranging from 1 (in Wyoming, Arkansas, and Delaware) to 49 (in 
California). The mean number of newspapers-per-state is 8.5 with a standard deviation of 8.68. 
The	 ﾠscale	 ﾠranges	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐.08	 ﾠto	 ﾠ.585,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrightward	 ﾠ
slant.
12	 ﾠI	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcollected	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
employ	 ﾠas	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠanalyses.13	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprior	 ﾠsection	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠRepublicans	 ﾠare,	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
else	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠless	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠthan	 ﾠDemocrats	 ﾠabout	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠRepublicans	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠthe	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccine.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠlevel,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
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11	 ﾠData	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠat:	 ﾠ
http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&msid=109496610648025582
911.0004686892fbefe515012&z=3	 ﾠand	 ﾠwww.flucount.org.	 ﾠI	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠverified	 ﾠdata	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_flu_pandemic_in_the_United_States.	 ﾠ
12 I am grateful to Matt Gentzkow for making these data available to me. See Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2010) for a detailed explanation of the construction of the slant scale. 
13 Data available at: http://www.statehealthfacts.org/. 	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should	 ﾠmanifest	 ﾠitself	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠinfection	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
higher	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠH1N1-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠfatality	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠin	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠproportions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
registered	 ﾠRepublicans-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐Democrats.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠ
coverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflu	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠconsumers’	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠpropensity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠseek	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvaccine,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠnet	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠfactors,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐
leaning	 ﾠstate	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlower	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccine	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠH1N1-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠdeath	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ As	 ﾠpreliminary	 ﾠtests	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpredictions,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
ttests.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠtest	 ﾠreveals,	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmy	 ﾠexpectations,	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ.30	 ﾠ
correlation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠswine	 ﾠflu	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠgap	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠ
indicating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠstates	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠmore	 ﾠRepublican,	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu-ﾭ‐related	 ﾠdeaths	 ﾠrise.	 ﾠ
Turning	 ﾠto	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccination	 ﾠrates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠover	 ﾠ6	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠof	 ﾠage,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdata	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐Republican	 ﾠtilts	 ﾠin	 ﾠparty	 ﾠ
registration,	 ﾠresidents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠover	 ﾠ8%	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvaccinated	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
states	 ﾠwith	 ﾠover	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐Democratic	 ﾠparty	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠtilt	 ﾠ
(.247	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠ.329,	 ﾠp<.03).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠfully	 ﾠ1.33	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
proportions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠvaccinated	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠH1N1.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠpredictably	 ﾠ
somewhat	 ﾠless	 ﾠstark,	 ﾠpattern	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvoted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠObama	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvoted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠRepublican	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠMcCain.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠvaccination	 ﾠgap	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ4	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ(.22	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠ.26,	 ﾠp<.02),	 ﾠor	 ﾠ2/3	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
vaccination	 ﾠscale.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠa	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 27	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠstate	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠand	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccination	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠfactors,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠpoverty,	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
factor.	 ﾠNor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthey	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠexposure.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
concerns,	 ﾠI	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠregression	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠresidents	 ﾠover	 ﾠ6	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠof	 ﾠage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwere	 ﾠvaccinated	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
H1N1	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠare	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠgap,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠvoted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠObama	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Controls	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
African	 ﾠAmerican,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠHispanic,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠper-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
swine	 ﾠflu	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideological	 ﾠslant	 ﾠin	 ﾠrhetoric	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠ
congressional	 ﾠdelegation	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠmeasured	 ﾠby	 ﾠGentzkow	 ﾠand	 ﾠShapiro	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠTables	 ﾠ1A	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1B	 ﾠ
present	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠ13	 ﾠregressions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠexcludes	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠ
(unemployment,	 ﾠrace,	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠcases	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrhetorical	 ﾠslant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
state’s	 ﾠcongressional	 ﾠdelegation).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠgap,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
third	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvoted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠObama	 ﾠdummy.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠincrementally	 ﾠadd	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvariations	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccine	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠI	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthem	 ﾠincrementally	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠleverage	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠ
[Tables	 ﾠA1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1B	 ﾠhere]	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠresults	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠ
causal	 ﾠfactors,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠgap	 ﾠand	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠvoted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠObama	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠimmunized	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠH1N1.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠdo	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrols,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠunemployment	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠrace,	 ﾠflu	 ﾠvaccination	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrhetorical	 ﾠ
slant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠcongressional	 ﾠdelegation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠModel	 ﾠ2	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐Democratic	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠtilt	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠimmunization	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ(p<.10).	 ﾠModel	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
voted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠObama	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠhad	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ2.7	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠimmunization	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠwho	 ﾠvoted	 ﾠfor	 ﾠSenator	 ﾠMcCain	 ﾠ(p<.10).	 ﾠModel	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
presents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbase	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠtest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐segregated	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠ
Stream	 ﾠhypothesis.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠhere	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstates	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconservative	 ﾠ
newspapers	 ﾠdid	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlower	 ﾠimmunization	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠafter	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠexplanations.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐point	 ﾠ
increase	 ﾠin	 ﾠrightward	 ﾠslant	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠnewspapers	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ.98	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ
decrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠimmunization	 ﾠrates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠreiterate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠnet	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideological	 ﾠslant	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠ
Congressional	 ﾠdelegation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.14	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠnet	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠgap,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠ
weaker	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ(with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐.98	 ﾠto	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐.76,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ.10	 ﾠlevel).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠunaffected	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠchild	 ﾠimmunization	 ﾠrates	 ﾠor	 ﾠadult	 ﾠflu	 ﾠvaccination	 ﾠrates	 ﾠare	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠas	 ﾠcontrols,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
remains	 ﾠsubstantively	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠin	 ﾠevery	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14 In separate models (not shown), I tested additional socio-economic factors such as the percent 
of the state’s population living in urban vs. rural communities, median state income, infant death 
rates, state spending on Medicaid and healthcare in general, per capita GDP, and population size. 
None significantly affected the H1N1 vaccination rate after the reported controls were included 
in the models. Hence, given my limited degrees of freedom, I excluded them from the reported 
results. 	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
socio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠor	 ﾠdemographic	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠincluded.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgeneralized	 ﾠskepticism	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠvaccinations	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfully	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreluctance	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠthe	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccine.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠ
presumably,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠvaccine	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠovertly	 ﾠpoliticized	 ﾠthan	 ﾠseasonal	 ﾠflu	 ﾠ
vaccines	 ﾠor	 ﾠchild	 ﾠimmunizations.	 ﾠ
Interestingly,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠreplicated	 ﾠTables	 ﾠ1A	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1B	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchildhood	 ﾠimmunizations	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠshown),	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠmodels.	 ﾠReplicating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠwith,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
adults	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠseasonal	 ﾠflu	 ﾠvaccines	 ﾠ(also	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshown),	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠis	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠ
affected	 ﾠby	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠmodels.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠmodels,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
coefficients	 ﾠon	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistently	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠ
immunization	 ﾠmodels.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant	 ﾠ
becomes	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠand	 ﾠinsignificant	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠgap	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠwords,	 ﾠabsent	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠflue	 ﾠvaccines,	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠslant	 ﾠserved	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠproxy.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcontrol,	 ﾠit	 ﾠloses	 ﾠits	 ﾠpredictive	 ﾠpower.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
suggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠseasonal	 ﾠflu,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
Democrats	 ﾠand	 ﾠRepublicans	 ﾠdo	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠowing	 ﾠto	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠtrust	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠand	 ﾠpronouncements	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
appear	 ﾠto	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠstem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐Segregated	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠStreams	 ﾠvia	 ﾠmass	 ﾠ
media.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Conclusion	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠbegan	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠby	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpuzzle:	 ﾠRepublicans	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠfar	 ﾠlower	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠintent	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠvaccines	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
Democratic	 ﾠcounterparts.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠexplanations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
partisan	 ﾠgap,	 ﾠI	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevolution	 ﾠof	 ﾠmass	 ﾠ
media	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐select	 ﾠinto	 ﾠideologically	 ﾠ“friendly”	 ﾠnews	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠenvironments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠtested	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠtermed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐Segregated	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠ
Stream	 ﾠHypothesis	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsets.	 ﾠI	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfound	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠgaps	 ﾠin	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflu	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappeared	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠnews	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠMost	 ﾠ
notably,	 ﾠRepublicans	 ﾠwho	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠand	 ﾠFox	 ﾠNews	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
news	 ﾠabout	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠless	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflu,	 ﾠless	 ﾠattentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠof	 ﾠpress	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠflu	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠwho	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠ
news	 ﾠsources,	 ﾠor	 ﾠDemocrats	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠnews	 ﾠsources.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠDemocrats	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠencountering	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠstreams	 ﾠboth	 ﾠin	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐selected	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠ
contexts,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠseek	 ﾠout	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐Administration	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠstreams,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
traditional	 ﾠnews	 ﾠmedia,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠIndexing	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠ(Bennett	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠBaum	 ﾠand	 ﾠGroeling	 ﾠ2010)	 ﾠ
anticipates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAdministration’s	 ﾠvoice	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠnews	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrisis,	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠearly	 ﾠstages.	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠthese	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠdata	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠreverse	 ﾠcausality	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
attitudes	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠvaccine	 ﾠare	 ﾠ“caused”	 ﾠby	 ﾠideological	 ﾠpreferences,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
turn	 ﾠ“cause”	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠtests	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
arrow	 ﾠis	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠfully	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠit	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
contributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem).	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Finally,	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠreal	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐level,	 ﾠvaccine	 ﾠdata	 ﾠreveals	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
attitudes	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠactual	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠ
vaccinations.	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠnew	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠexposure,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
able	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠtone	 ﾠof	 ﾠnewspaper	 ﾠcoverage	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠleft-ﾭ‐to-ﾭ‐
right	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠH1N1	 ﾠvaccine,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠafter	 ﾠaccounting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexplanations,	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
state’s	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠorientation,	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠdemographics,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠand	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠprofile	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠpopulation.	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠis	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠsuggestive,	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠa	 ﾠlinkage	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐Segregated	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠStreams	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠor	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠvaccine	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠherein	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmass	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠ
environment	 ﾠhold	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠprofound	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhealth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Current	 ﾠtrends	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠever	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐selection	 ﾠand	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠ
sophisticated	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠfiltering	 ﾠand	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠtargeting	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠall	 ﾠappear	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠportend	 ﾠa	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠaudience	 ﾠfragmentation	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠshrinking	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInformational	 ﾠcommons.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠinevitable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnews	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
increasingly	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠfiltering	 ﾠtechnologies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallow	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠdistributors	 ﾠ
like	 ﾠNetflix	 ﾠand	 ﾠiTunes	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠmovies	 ﾠor	 ﾠmusic	 ﾠa	 ﾠcustomer	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
prefer,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠto	 ﾠnews	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠcontent.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠend	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠCass	 ﾠSunstein	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠterms	 ﾠ“cyberbalkanization,”	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
informational	 ﾠcommons	 ﾠis	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠsupplanted	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“daily	 ﾠme”	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠ	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encounter	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnews	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwant,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpreexisting	 ﾠattitudes.	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformational	 ﾠcommons	 ﾠ
disappears	 ﾠentirely,	 ﾠthere is little question that technological innovations and shifts in audience 
behavior are changing the way citizens consume news, with content growing increasingly 
personalized and subject to individual preferences regarding what, when and where they 
entertain themselves or expose themselves to politically themed information. 
Given the enormity and speed of the changes in this media marketplace, the potential 
consequences for democratic participation and the strategic landscape for politicians, the 
evolution of the communication environment within in which our politics are contested seems 
likely to play a central role in shaping the future course of American democracy. With respect to 
public health, to	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠSelf-ﾭ‐Segregated	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠStream	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠ
apace,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoliticization	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠcampaigns	 ﾠposes	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠpolicy.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠincumbent	 ﾠupon	 ﾠpolicymakers	 ﾠto	 ﾠstrive	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
politicization	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreatest	 ﾠextent	 ﾠpossible.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠissues	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
intrinsically	 ﾠpartisan,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠeasy	 ﾠto	 ﾠmiss	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠpolarized	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbehaviors,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠnew	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
commercial	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠto	 ﾠexploit.	 ﾠFailing	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
polarized	 ﾠdebates	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠseemingly	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐partisan	 ﾠissues	 ﾠlike	 ﾠprotecting	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠflu	 ﾠ
pandemics	 ﾠthus	 ﾠrisks	 ﾠundermining	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeffectiveness.	 ﾠ
 
   	 ﾠ 33	 ﾠ
REFERENCES 
All, David. 2007. “Is Yahoo!’s Online Debate Going to be Fair and Balanced?” techPresident 
Blog, April 26. techpresident.com/blog-entry/yahoo’s-online-debate-going-be-fair-and-
balanced. 
Baum, Matthew A. 2003. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy 
in the New Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Baum, Matthew A. Forthcoming. Preaching to the Choir or Converting the Flock: Presidential 
Communication Strategies in the Age of Three Medias. In iPolitics, edited by Richard 
Fox and Jennifer M. Ramos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baum, Matthew A., and Tim Groeling. 2008. “New Media and the Polarization of American 
Political Discourse.” Political Communication 25 (4): 345-65. 
Baum, Matthew A. and Tim Groeling. 2010. War Stories: The Causes and Consequences of 
Citizen Views of War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Baum, Matthew A. and Sam Kernell. 1999. “Has Cable Ended the Golden Age of Presidential 
Television?” American Political Science Review 93 (March): 1-16. 
Baum, Matthew A. and Samuel Kernell. 2007. “How Cable Ended the Golden Age of 
Presidential Television: From 1969-2006.” In The Principles and Practice of American 
Politics, edited by Samuel Kernell and Steven S. Smith. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 
Baum, Matthew A. and Henry Nau. 2009. “Foreign Policy Views and U.S. Standing in the 
World.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3-6. 
Bennett, W. Lance. 1990. “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States.” 
Journal of Communication 40 (2): 103-125. 	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
Boehlert, Eric. 2009. “Why Don’t We Just Pretend Rush Limbaugh Has 50 Million Viewers?” 
Media Matters for America. March 9. mediamatters.org/columns/200903090031. 
Campbell, Angus, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American 
Voter. New York: Wiley. 
Della Vigna, Stefano and Ethan Kaplan. 2003. “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting,” 
Manuscript, Berkeley, California, March 30. elsa. berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/wp/foxvote06-
03-30.pdf. 
Feltus, Will. 2009. “Cable News Bias? Audiences Say ‘Yes’.” National Media Research, 
Planning, and Placement. October 29.  nmrpp.com/CableNewsBiasAudiences.pdf. 
Gentzkow, Matthew and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2010. “Ideological Segregation Online and Offline.” 
NBER Working Paper 15916. www.nber.org/papers/w15916.pdf. 
Hamilton, James T. 2003. All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market Transforms 
Information into News. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hindman, Matthew. 2007. The Myth of Digital Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Holsti, Ole R. 2004. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 2006. A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People. 
New York: Pearson Longman. 
Jacobson, Gary C. 2007. “The War, the President, and the 2006 Midterm Congressional 
Elections.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 12-15. 	 ﾠ 35	 ﾠ
Jones, Jeffrey. 2009. “State of the States: Political Party Affiliation.” Gallup, January 28. 
www.gallup.com/poll/114016/state-states-political-party-affiliation.aspx. 
Kernell, Samuel and Laurie L. Rice. 2010. “Cable and Partisan Polarization of the President’s 
Audience.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego. 
Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis. 2003. “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq 
War,” Political Science Quarterly 118 (4): 569-598.  
Maugh, Thomas H. 2009. “Beck and Limbaugh Weigh in on Swine Flu.”  Booster Shots, LA 
Times, October 8. latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2009/10/the-folks-who-
publicly-said-they-would-rather-see-the-us-go-down-the-toilet-in-the-current-recession-
rather-than-see-a-demo.html. 
Lynd, Robert and Helen Lynd. 1929. Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company. 
Media Matters for America. 2010. “Asman Responds to Surplus of H1N1 Vaccine by 
Fearmongering Over Danger of Vaccines.” July 1. 
mediamatters.org/mmtv/201007010074. 
Page, Benjamin I. and Marshall M. Bouton. 2006. The Foreign Policy Dis*Connect: What 
Americans WANT from our Leaders but DON’T GET. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Parker-Pope, Tara. 2009. “Bill Maher vs. the Flu Vaccine.” Well Blog, New York Times, October 
13. 
Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism. 2009. “The State of the News Media 2009.” 
www.stateofthemedia.org/2009. 
Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism. 2010. “The State of the News Media 2010.” 	 ﾠ 36	 ﾠ
www.stateofthemedia.org/2010. 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2008. “News Consumption and Believability 
Study.” August 17. people-press.org/reports/pdf/444.pdf. 
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2011. “Internet Gains on Television as 
Public’s Main News Source.” January 4. people-press.org/reports/pdf/689.pdf. 
Prior, Markus. 2007. Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in 
Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
San Antonio Express-News. 2009. “Cornyn Rips White House Over H1N1 Vaccine.” November 
5. www.mysanantonio.com/default/article/Cornyn-rips-White-House-over-H1N1-
vaccine-843346.php. 
Schlesinger, Robert. 2009a. “Whether to Get the H1N1 Vaccine.” Thomas Jefferson Street Blog, 
U.S. News & World Report, October 15. www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-
schlesinger/2009/10/15/whether-to-get-the-h1n1-vaccine. 
Schlesinger, Robert. 2009b. “Democrats More Likely to Get the H1N1 Vaccine Than 
Republicans.” Thomas Jefferson Street Blog, U.S. News & World Report, October 16. 
www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/2009/10/16/democrats-more-likely-
to-get-h1n1-vaccine-than-republicans-2. 
Schudson, Michael. 1981. Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Sunstein, Cass. 2007. Republic.com 2.0. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Thrush, Glenn. 2009. “Republican Doctors Question Virus Vaccine.”  Politico, May 7. 
www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/22205.html. 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 37	 ﾠ
TABLE	 ﾠ1A.	 ﾠCorrelates	 ﾠof	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠVaccination,	 ﾠby	 ﾠState	 ﾠ(Part	 ﾠ1)	 ﾠ
!"# !$# !%# !&# !'# !(# !)#
*+,-./.+0123/45 6789:"; 678)(7< 678)99< 6"877$; 678(((< 67899%; 6789"%;
!78&$# !78&%# !78&(# !78&%# !78%&# !78&$# !78&$#
=4+>.3?@>+451!9A79# 6"87&&;;; 6"87%";;; 6"8"7$;;; 6"87)&;;; 678(:(< 6"87':;;; 6"87&(;;;
!78$:# !78$:# !78$9# !78$)# !78%'# !78%7# !78$:#
B1C3/DE 678'7:;;; 678&'9;;; 678&&);; 678'7&;;; 678&$9;;; 678'%);; 678&)&;;;
!78"$# !78"$# !78"&# !78"$# !7879:# !78"9# !78"%#
B1FG-./4GD 678""'< 678""$< 678"$(; 678"""< 6787)( 678"7) 678""'<
!787'9# !787':# !787'$# !787(7# !787("# !787('# !787("#
F"*"1H/-+-1.+01D/.G5/ 787"7' 78779 787"7 787"7 7877) 787"7 787""%
!787""# !787"$# !787"%# !787"$# !787""# 6787"" !787"$#
H?4I0+--G?4/31J+3+I/5G?4123/45 678")"; 678"$' 678"%& 678")7; 678":%; 678")9; 678"'%<













H?4-5/45 789'&;;; 78:"";;; 78:%(;;; 7899$;;; 78&%( 789'$;;; 789$';;;
!78$7# !78$"# !78$%# !78$'# !78$:# !78$7# !78$7#
OP-+0X/5G?4- '7 '7 '7 '7 '7 '7 '7




	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 38	 ﾠ
TABLE	 ﾠ1B.	 ﾠCorrelates	 ﾠof	 ﾠSwine	 ﾠFlu	 ﾠVaccination,	 ﾠby	 ﾠState	 ﾠ(Part	 ﾠII)	 ﾠ
!"# !$# !%&# !%%# !%'# !%(#
)*+,-.-*/012.34 5%6&&'7 5&6$$%7 5&6$8%7 5&6"$97 5&6$(97 5&6$$&7
!&69(# !&69'# !&699# !&69&# !&69'# 5&699&
:3*;-2<=;*340!$>&$# 5%6&?%77 5%6&('77 5%6&'@77 5%6&'$777 5%6&'@777 5%6&@(77
!&6(%# !&6(&# !&6'$# !&6'$# !&6'"# !&6(%#
A0B2.CD 5&6@'&777 5&6@&?777 5&6@&&777 5&69$@777 5&69$"777 5&6@%&777
!&6%9# !&6%'# !&6%(# !&6%'# !&6%'# 5&6%(&
A0EF,-.3FC 5&6%'&G 5&6%&" 5&6%%8G 5&6%&(G 5&6%&9G 5&6%%9G
!&6&88# !&6&?%# !&6&8&# !&6&@'# !&6&8&# !&6&8&#
E%)%0H.,*,0-*/0C.-F4. &6&%& &6&%&' &6&%&( &6&%&% &6&%&" &6&%&8
!&6&%%# !&6&%%# !&6&%'# !&6&%%# !&6&%'# !&6&%%#
H<3I/*,,F<3.20J*2*I.4F<3012.34 5&6%?'7 5&6%?97 5&6%8$7 5&6%887 5&6%@?G 5&6%?'7















H<3,4.34 &6$@8777 &6$8@777 &6$'$777 &6"?"777 &6"$"777 &6$89777
!&6'&# !&6'&# !&6'(# !&6'&# !&6'&# !&6'9#
OP,*/Y.4F<3, @& @& @& @& @& @&
K5,ZU./*N &68& &68& &68& &68% &68& &68&
K<PU,40,4.3N./N0*//</,0F30-./*34R*,*,





























































































Strength of Ideology 
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Accessed Political Blogs on Internet, as 
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